

Barcan Up the Wrong Tree

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Slides and Handout: <https://goo.gl/WwJ7jw>

May 5, 2017

Society for Exact Philosophy

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Necessitism, Contingentism, and The Barcan Formulas

NECESSITISM AND CONTINGENTISM

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The heart of necessitism is that the domains of all possible worlds are identical.

BARCAN FORMULAS

Williamson and others have taken the validity of the formula

$$\diamond \exists x \varphi \leftrightarrow \exists x \diamond \varphi \quad (\text{BF} + \text{CBF})$$

to be the point of disagreement between necessitists and contingentists.

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Thesis

BF+CBF are neither sufficient nor necessary for settling the debate between necessitists and contingentists.

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BF+CBF are neither sufficient nor necessary for settling the debate between necessitists and contingentists.

Upshot: What is sufficient for settling the debate are the structural rules of a language that govern the behavior of names in modal contexts.

BQML

Language: $\text{Atoms} \cup \{\wedge, \neg, \diamond, \exists\}$.

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Sequent: Ordered Pairs of sets of formulas: $\Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma$

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Need to keep track of denoting and non-denoting terms

Hypersequents are sets of sequents flanked by sets of names

$$A \{ (\Gamma_1 \Rightarrow \Sigma_1); \dots; (\Gamma_n \Rightarrow \Sigma_n) \} B$$

$\varphi \quad \psi \quad \gamma \quad \theta$
Sentences

HYPERSEQUENTS

φ	ψ	γ	θ
T	F	F	T

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \varphi, \theta & \Rightarrow & \psi, \gamma \\ T & & F \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \Gamma & \Rightarrow & \Sigma \\ T & & F \end{array}$$

$$(\Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma)$$

w

$$\frac{(\Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma)}{w_1} \quad ; \quad \frac{(\Delta \Rightarrow \Lambda)}{w_2}$$

HYPERSEQUENTS

$$\frac{(\Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma)}{w_1} \ ; \ \frac{(\Delta \Rightarrow \Lambda)}{w_2} \ ; \ \dots \ ; \ \frac{(\Pi \Rightarrow \Theta)}{w_n}$$

HYPERSEQUENTS

A $\{$ $(\Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma)$; $(\Delta \Rightarrow \Lambda)$; ... ; $(\Pi \Rightarrow \Theta)$ $\}$ B
Might denote w_1 w_2 w_n Can't denote

$$\frac{\vdots}{A \uparrow (\Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma); (\Delta \Rightarrow \Lambda); (\Pi \Rightarrow \Theta) \downarrow B}$$

SAYS: There are no worlds where ...

Structural Rules:

$$\text{Id} \frac{}{A \wr G; (\Gamma, \varphi \Rightarrow \varphi, \Sigma); H \wr B}$$

$$\text{Id}_t \frac{}{A, t \wr G \wr t, B}$$

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Weakening

$$\text{W}_s \frac{A \wp G; (\Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma); H \wp B}{A \wp G; (\Gamma, \Delta \Rightarrow \Lambda, \Sigma); H \wp B}$$

$$\text{W}_t \frac{A \wp G \wp B}{A, C \wp G \wp D, B}$$

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Negation:

$$\text{L}_{\neg} \frac{A \wp G; (\Gamma \Rightarrow \varphi, \Sigma); H \wp B}{A \wp G; (\Gamma, \neg \varphi \Rightarrow \Sigma); H \wp B}$$

$$\text{R}_{\neg} \frac{A \wp G; (\Gamma, \varphi \Rightarrow \Sigma); H \wp B}{A \wp G; (\Gamma \Rightarrow \neg \varphi, \Sigma); H \wp B}$$

- Modal Rules:

$$L_{\diamond} \frac{A \uparrow G; (\varphi \Rightarrow \quad); (\Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma) H \uparrow B}{A \uparrow G; (\Gamma, \diamond\varphi \Rightarrow \Sigma); H \uparrow B}$$

$$R_{\diamond} \frac{A \uparrow G; (\Delta \Rightarrow \varphi, \Lambda); (\Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma); H \uparrow B}{A \uparrow G; (\Delta \Rightarrow \Lambda); (\Gamma \Rightarrow \diamond\varphi, \Sigma); H \uparrow B}$$

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- Quantifier Rules:

$$L\exists \frac{A, t \uparrow G; (\Gamma, \varphi[t/x] \Rightarrow \Sigma); H \uparrow B}{A \uparrow G; (\Gamma, \exists x\varphi \Rightarrow \Sigma); H \uparrow B}$$

$$R\exists \frac{A \uparrow G; (\Gamma \Rightarrow \varphi[t/x], \Sigma); H \uparrow B \quad A \uparrow G; (\Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma); H \uparrow B, t}{A \uparrow G; (\Gamma \Rightarrow \exists x\varphi, \Sigma); H \uparrow B}$$

where t does not occur in the conclusion of $L\exists$.

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Fact

$BF + CBF$ is valid according to *BQML*

Model Theory

Models come with a set of worlds W , for each world w a domain d_w of individuals.

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Call this set of models \mathcal{M}_C .

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BQML is sound and complete with respect to both \mathcal{M}_C and \mathcal{M}_N

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Upshot: BF+CBF is insufficient to distinguish between contingentism and necessitism

An Objection

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ARGUMENT

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RESPONSE: Premise 2 is false

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Add \exists to the language.

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Change the structure of hypersequents:

A sequent is now a quadruple of two sets of names and two sets of sentences.

A hypersequent is a set of sequents without sets of names on either side.

φ ψ γ θ
Sentences

φ	ψ	γ	θ
T	F	F	T

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \varphi, \theta & \Rightarrow & \psi, \gamma \\ T & & F \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \Gamma & \Rightarrow & \Sigma \\ T & & F \end{array}$$

A : $\Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma$: B
Denotes T F doesn't denote

$$(A : \Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma : B)$$

w

$$\underbrace{(A : \Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma : B)}_{w_1} \ ; \ \underbrace{(C : \Delta \Rightarrow \Lambda : D)}_{w_2} \ ; \ \dots \ ; \ \underbrace{(P : \Pi \Rightarrow \Theta : Q)}_{w_n}$$

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- Equivalent rules for \exists

$$\text{L}\exists \frac{G; (t : \Rightarrow \cdot); (A : \Gamma, \varphi[t/x] \Rightarrow \Sigma : B); H}{G; (\Gamma, \exists x \varphi \Rightarrow \Sigma); H}$$

$$\text{R}\exists \frac{G; (C : \Delta \Rightarrow \Lambda : D); (A : \Gamma \Rightarrow \varphi[t/x], \Sigma : B); H \quad G; (C : \Delta \Rightarrow \Lambda : D, t); (A : \Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma : B); H}{G; (C : \Delta \Rightarrow \Lambda : D); (A : \Gamma \Rightarrow \exists x \varphi, \Sigma : B); H}$$

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- Rules for \exists

$$\text{L}\exists \frac{G; (A, t : \Gamma, \varphi[t/x] \Rightarrow \Sigma : B); H}{G; (A : \Gamma, \exists x \varphi \Rightarrow \Sigma : B); H}$$

$$\text{R}\exists \frac{G; (A : \Gamma \Rightarrow \varphi[t/x], \Sigma : B); H \quad G; (A : \Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma : t, B); H}{G; (A : \Gamma \Rightarrow \exists x \varphi, \Sigma : B); H}$$

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Fact

CQML proves that $(: \diamond \exists x \square \neg Fx \Rightarrow \exists x \neg Fx :)$

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1. If a sentence is not ontologically committing then none of its consequences are ontologically committing.
2. Contingentists hold (and necessitists allow it) that $\diamond\exists x\square\neg Fx$ entails no sentence that commits one to there being $\neg F$'s
3. Since $\diamond\exists x\square\neg Fx$ entails $\exists x\neg Fx$, all the consequences of $\exists x\neg Fx$ are consequences of $\diamond\exists x\square\neg Fx$.
- C. $\exists x\neg Fx$ entails no sentences that commits one to there being $\neg F$'s.

Recapturing the Disagreement

RECAPTURING NECESSITISM

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E_{x_t}

$$E_{x_t} \frac{G; (C, t : \Delta \Rightarrow \Lambda : D); (A : \Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma : B); H}{G; (C : \Delta \Rightarrow \Lambda : D); (A, t : \Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma : B); H}$$

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Ex_t

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Call $\text{CQML} + \text{Ex}_t$ *NQML*

Adequacy Fact

CQML is sound and complete with respect to \mathcal{M}_C and *NQML* is sound and complete with respect to \mathcal{M}_N

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Call $\text{CQML} + \text{Ex}_t$ *NQML*

Adequacy Fact

CQML is sound and complete with respect to \mathcal{M}_C and *NQML* is sound and complete with respect to \mathcal{M}_N

Adequacy Fact holds even before the language has connectives, modal operators, or quantifiers

UPSHOTS

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2. Arguments about the validity of BF +CBF are only indirectly relevant to the disagreement between necessitism and contingentism

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1. BF + CBF is neither necessary nor sufficient to characterize the disagreement between necessitists and contingentists
2. Arguments about the validity of BF + CBF are only indirectly relevant to the disagreement between necessitism and contingentism
3. The dispute between necessitists and contingentists rests on the behavior of names, not the validity of any sentence.

Thanks!